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Decentralization  since  early  1990s  has  become  one  of  the
buzzwords of the development paradigms. Among all ingredients
of  decentralization,  the  fiscal  component  of  it  has  a  special
significance.  Not  surprisingly  the  literature  unanimously
recognizes  that  it  is  the  regulation  of  intergovernmental
relationships in the fiscal arena that can strike the right balance
among different  objectives  of  each  level  and  resolve  tensions
between them. Thus, the fiscal decentralization is in vogue. The
trend that began in 90s has only gained momentum at the turn of
the century. Yet the outcome of adopting similar policies has not
been uniform across the globe.  Some have succeeded,  some
are stumbling and some others have failed. In fact, the success
of decentralization depends on its design. The paper looks into
various  questions  associated  with  the  dilemma  of  designing
decentralization  instruments  for  the  success  of  fiscal
decentralization   These include  the  question  of  designing  the
right  mix  of  policies,  the  questions  of  sequencing  and
synchronization, the question of pace and that of balancing the
contrasting  forces  of  centralization  and  decentralization.  The
paper offers the insight to the policymakers that while designing
fiscal decentralization they should not try to replicate any ‘ideal
type’ solution. Though the ideal types can be powerful analytical
tools, yet they do not lead to solutions for specific situations Real
world fiscal arrangements rarely follow the idealized model; they
are  loaded  with  historical  developments  and  political  ad  hoc
solutions. It is simply not realistic to start from tabula rasa.  The
paper emphasizes that there is no “one size fits all” type answer
to decentralization question.  All  systems will  have to  work out
their own style of going about decentralization and restructuring
of  intergovernmental  relations  depending  on  the  context  and
conditions peculiar to their own situation. The paper also argues
that any attempt  towards fiscal  decentralization must  be firmly
grounded in the basic principles of fiscal federalism, irrespective
of  the  fact  whether  the  country  in  question  is  an  officially
declared  federal  state  or  not.  Thus  while  implementing
decentralization policies,  the need is to ‘bring the federal back
in’. 
There is a world wide trend toward increasing transfer of power,
resources  and  responsibilities  to  the  subnational  levels  of
government.  Both  federal  and  unitary  countries,  whether
industrialized  or  developing  are  moving  toward  more  fiscal
decentralization.  This  trend  towards  greater  fiscal
decentralization  that  began  in  1980’s  with  many  developing
countries embarking on the path to devolve more functions to the
local jurisdictions, gained momentum during 9o’s.  Paul Smoke
(2001) asserts that during the 1990s, fiscal decentralization and
local  government  reform  have  become  among  the  most
widespread trends in development. This trend, according to Ter-
Minassian (1997), is evident not only in federal countries but also
in  many  unitary  countries  including  some  that  have  a  long
tradition of centralist government. Political developments in Latin
America,  Asia  and  Africa  point  toward  a  trend  en  route  for
increasing  decentralization.  The  trend  is  visible  in  post
communist  Central  and Eastern Europe (CEE).  The trend can
also be observed even in essentially centralized countries such
as  Jordan  and  Morocco.   Countries  like  India,  Mexico  and
Pakistan  are  also  trying  to  improve  upon  their  fiscal  federal
arrangements  to  make  them  more  responsive  and  efficient.
Certain studies have shown that out  of the 75 developing and
transition countries  with  populations  greater  than 5 million,  63
have  embarked  on  some  form  of  fiscal  decentralization
(Helmsing, 1999,  Robert  D.Ebel, 2001).  In fact addressing
the  challenge  of  devising  best  achievable  array  of
assignment of functions and responsibilities is, in words of
Richard  Bird  (1993)  “…a question  at  the  centre  of  policy
debate in countries around the world.”    In order to address
the  dilemma  of  design  section  I sets  the  context  by
highlighting  the  cases  of  decentralization  failure,  thus
underpinning the relevance and gravity of the said dilemma.
This naturally leads to the question of ensuring success that
is taken up in the  section II.  This section deals with many
popular questions relating to design and pace for ensuring
success of decentralization policies. The paper reviews the
existing literature (subsections A to E) and highlights that
there  is  no  single  right  strategy  or  design  that  could  be
projected  as  “success  mantra”  for  all  countries.  However
while customizing decentralization to strike their own chord;
the policy makers must not lose sight of the basic principles
of fiscal federalism (as highlighted in the conclusion).  
I. Decentralization Failure: 
There  is  an  ample  evidence  to  prove  that  an
overenthusiastic  and  imbalanced  approach  to  fiscal
decentralization can produce a market-distorting effect  (as
against  market  preserving).  This has happened in case of
Brazil and Argentina. Brazil is an example of an unbalanced
federal  system where states  and municipalities  have won.
They dominate the union and compete among themselves in
a  disorganized  and  predatory  fashion.  Experience  of
Argentina shows  that  perversely  structured  systems  of
intergovernmental finance can destabilize public sector and
economy  as  a  whole.  The  World  Development  Report
1999/2000 (Chap 5) has arrived at  certain  observations in
this regard:  (a) Decentralization if improperly pursued can
lower the quality of public services as in Latin America and
Russia.  (Chap  5,  end  note  13).   (b)  A  poorly  handled
decentralization can threaten macroeconomic stability (Chap
5,  endnote  26).  (c)  Fiscal  decentralization  reduces  the
central  government’s  control  over  public  resources  thus
hampering  a  government’s  ability  to  respond to  economic
shocks.  The  government  of  Philippines for  example,  is
required to share nearly half of its internal tax revenues with
subnational governments, limiting its ability to adjust budget
in response to shocks. (Ch.5 p 111).  
Further  there  are  many  studies  that  conclude  that  under
certain  circumstances fiscal  decentralization  may produce
the  results  exactly  opposite  to  what  pro-decentralization
literature may assert.  For instance: (a) Spillovers, common
pool  problems  and  problems  from soft  budget  constraints
result  in  efficiency losses  associated  with  decentralization
(Inman  and  Rubinfeld  1997,  Sanguinetti  1994,    Rodden
2000,  Stein  1998,  Wildasin  1997 and Willis,  Garman and
Haggard 1998).   (b) Davoodi and Zou have found in their
studies that fiscal decentralization is associated with slower
economic  growth.(Davoodi  and  Zou,  1998;  Xie,  Zou  and
Davoodi, 1999) (c) In some studies local Governments were
found  to  be  more  corrupt  &  decentralization  in  certain
studies  has  been  shown to  be  leading  directly  to  greater
state capture (Goldsmith,  1999, Bardhan and Mookherjee,
2000). (d) It has also been argued that there is no significant
relationship  between  fiscal  decentralization  and  public
sector size (Oates, 1985; Nelson, 1986). Thus the assertion
that it limits the size of public sector is not true.
What  is more serious is that  if  ‘decentralization’  aspect  is
stretched to its  extreme it  can even encourage and incite
separatist  tendencies  as is happening in  Italy. Wallace  E.
Oates (1999), have stated that in Italy the movement toward
decentralization has gone so far as to encompass a serious
proposal  for  the  separation  of  the  nation  into  two
independent countries (p1120). 
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In past also the experience has shown the
limits  of  a  ‘largely’ decentralized
distribution of powers in terms of inducing
and  maintaining  federal  cohesion.  Most
unique  experiment  was  that  of  West
Indies, which assigned very few powers to
the federal  government,  so much so that
there  was  a  significant  lack  of  financial
resources even to make those trim powers
effective  that  were  entrusted  to  the
federation.  Within  a short  time it  became
obvious  that  the  sense  of  community
shared by the islands was not sufficient to
hold  the  federation  together.  This  was
exacerbated  by  the  relative  paucity  of
powers to generate support for the federal
government.  Following  the  succession  of
Jamaica and then Trinidad, the “salt water
federation” was officially  dissolved by the
British Government in 1962, only five years
after  its  foundation  in  1957.   Another
instance  is  of  Bosnia Herzegovina.  The
country adopted federalist structure under
Dyton  Peace  Agreement.  But  the
agreement  seriously  compromised  some
basic  principles  of  “fiscal  federalism” and
powers  of  the  state  with  respect  to
subcentral units were highly curtailed. The
state now faces the challenge of carrying
out even its minimal responsibilities, since
it  relies  on  transfers  from  the  entities.
Moreover,  since  central  government  has
little  resources  and  power  to  offset
regional imbalances, large inequalities are
likely  to  develop  among  and  within  the
entities  (as  economic  conditions  differ
substantially across the country) (Fox and
Wallich  1997).  It  is  in  such  context  that
Prud’homme  (1995)  warned  against
potential  dangers  of  decentralization  and
Vito  Tanzi(1996)  challenged  the  role  of
decentralization  as  a  means  to  foster
growth  and  development.  Some  authors
have  even  argued  that  in  post  Soviet
context,  greater  centralization  is  in  fact
required (Polishchuk, 2000, Stoner Weiss,
2001).  Thus  the  recent  literature  on
centralization-decentralization  debate  tilts
in favour of  the argument  that  in case of
developing  and  transition  economies
existence  of  strong  center  (political
centralization)  at  least  in  short  run  is
required.  In a short-term perspective and
under the strong pressure of both radical
and “over the night”  systematic economic
and  political  reforms,  sometimes  even
accompanied  by  state  transition,
decentralization need not necessarily be a
prerequisite  for  good  governance.
According  to  Luiz  de  Mello  and  Matias
Barenstein   (2001),  “Because
improvements in governance take time to
mature,  fiscal  decentralization  should  not
be  used  as  a  catalyst  for  improving
governance” 
In  fact  the  policy  oriented  research  has
clearly demonstrated that the tendency in
public  policy  discussion  to  distinguish
between economic  objectives on the one
hand,  and  political  and  constitutional
objectives  on  the  other,  is  inappropriate.
Real  world  fiscal  arrangements  rarely
follow the idealized model; they are loaded
with  historical  developments  and  political
ad hoc solutions. It is simply not realistic to
start  from  tabula  rasa.  In  any  case,
economic  fundamentals  are  not  the  only
logic of good governance. Though the ideal
types can be powerful analytical tools, yet
they  do  not  lead  to  solutions  for  specific
situations.
II. The Question of Ensuring Success: 
The  above  description  shows  two things.
Firstly, it shows that the decentralization is
now a political reality world-wide (though it
varies  greatly  in  form  within  and  among
countries)  and  secondly  that  there  are
cases when decentralization fails to deliver.
Implication of the first is that the debate on
whether  decentralization  is  good  or  bad
has  lost  its  relevance.  Implication  of  the
second  point  is  that  the  debate  now has
shifted  to  the  problem  of  designing
instruments  and  ensuring  conditions  for
success of decentralization. 
In  recent  decentralization  literature  it  has
been  emphasized  that  decentralization  in
itself is neither good nor bad (IBRD, 2000;
107).  The  implementation  of  similar
decentralization  policies  in  different
countries may produce different  outcomes
depending  on  the  specificities  of  the
country in question, such as the strength of
existing  institutions  and  legacies  of
centralization.   The  World  Development
Report (1999, pp 107-124) asserts that the
question  today  is  not  whether
decentralization  is  good or  bad,  the more
important  question  is  whether  it  is
successful  or  not.  It  says  that  successful
decentralization  improves  the  efficiency
and  responsiveness  of  the  public  sector
while accommodating potentially  explosive
political  forces  whereas  unsuccessful
decentralization  threatens  economic  and
political stability and disrupts the delivery of
the public services. The report argues that
the success of decentralization depends on
its design. 
It  is generally argued that decentralization
of government  in terms of devolution, can
improve  governance  by  fostering
accountability,  participation,  and
transparency.   But devolution in itself does
not  guarantee  better  governance.  Indeed,
ineffective  or  improper  devolution  creates
more problems than it solves. Therefore, it
is vital that decentralization instruments are
carefully  crafted  keeping  in  view  the
specific context of the country in question.
The  idea  here  is  to  reinforce  the
importance of effective planning and design
in undertaking decentralization.
A.  Striking the Right Mix of Policy
Instruments: 
 At  least  seven components  of  designing
decentralization are crucial for its success.
The  aim  is  to  create  institutions  which
provide  disincentives  for  citizens  to  free-
ride or for decision-makers at various levels
of government to either overgraze the fiscal
commons or evade responsibility  for
citizens  whose  needs  place
disproportionate  burdens  on  public
expenditure:  1.  Finance  should
follow  function:  Revenue  raising
authority  must  be  linked,  at  the
margin  to  the  service  provision
responsibilities.  2.  Informed  public
opinion:  There  should  be  local
access to right information to enable
the  local  community  to  develop
meaningful public opinion and decide
priorities.  3. Mechanisms for making
local priorities known must be put in
place.   4.  Credible  incentives  for
people  to  participate:  Writers  on
institutional  economics  have  long
observed that people’s willingness to
participate  varies  according  to  their
perception of how much impact such
participation  will  have  (Hirschman,
1970;  North,  1990;  Ostrom  and
others  1993).  5.  Adherence  to  local
priorities: There should be compelling
incentives  for  politicians  to  be
responsive  and  accountable.  6.
Appropriate  incentives  for  sub
national  governments  to  maintain
fiscal  responsibility:  It  is  argued that
destabilization  effects  of
decentralization  arose  mainly  from
inappropriate  incentives  than  any
problem  inherent  in  decentralization
(Spahn  1997)  including  soft  budget
constraints. 7. Designing instruments
of decentralization to support political
objectives:  The  instruments  of
decentralization  at  the disposal  of  a
policy  maker  are:   (i)  Legal
institutional  framework.  (ii)  Structure
of  service  delivery  responsibilities.
(iii) Allocation of various taxes among
different levels of the government. (iv)
Intergovernmental  transfers   (v)
Central  government  controls  and
constraints  upon  sub  national
borrowing   (vi)  Local  government
election rules. 
Decentralization  is  a  mixture  of
administrative,  fiscal  and  political
functions and relationships. In design
of decentralization all  three must  be
included.  However,  applying  these
principles in practice is a complicated
task.   This  is  because  different
decentralization  instruments  (taken
independently)  will  produce  different
consequences for different objectives
(such  as  economic  efficiency,
macroeconomic  stability,  income
redistribution  and  political  efficiency)
under  different  circumstances.  The
‘right  mix  of  the  policy  instruments’
has  to  be  shaped  while  taking  into
account specific circumstances of the
country  concerned.  It  is  thus  not
possible  to  propose  a
‘decentralization model’ that would fit
all  the  countries.  To  quote
Prud’Homme(2001),  “  They  (policy
makers) are like a composer writing a
symphony  for  a  number  of
instruments;  the  quality  of  the
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symphony  will  depend  upon  the  melody
written for each instrument and also upon
the  combination  of   the  many  melodic
lines.”
B. The Question of Synchronization and
Sequencing:
 
Burki  and  others  (1999)  have  argued
‘Decentralization  often  takes  place  amid
political  and  economic  turmoil…Even
where  decentralization  happens  in  less
dramatic context, questions of strategy and
timing  still  arise….There  is  clearly  no
blueprint  for  decentralization…..(but)  the
most  consistent  lesson  of  recent
decentralization experience is the need to
synchronize the elements of reform.”   
Decentralization  is  a  mixture  of
administrative, fiscal and political functions
and  relationships.  In  the  design  of
decentralization systems all three must be
included.  [Cohen  and  Peterson  1999,
Schneider  2003,  Manor  1997].  Schneider
makes the distinction between these three
dimensions. “Fiscal decentralization refers
to how much of the money collected and
spent  by  government  goes  through  non-
central government entities. Administrative
decentralization  refers  to  how  much
autonomy non-central government entities
have  relative  to  central  control.  Finally,
political  decentralization  refers  to  the
degree  to  which  non-central  government
entities  satisfy  the  political  functions  of
governance,  such  as  representation”.  He
further  states  that  there  is  a  range  of
possible ways in  which these dimensions
could interact. One possible pattern is that
increasing  decentralization  in  one
dimension  leads  to  an  increase  in
decentralization  in  other  dimension.  A
second  pattern  is  that  increasing
decentralization in one dimension leads to
a decrease  in  decentralization in  another
dimension.  With  three  dimensions  there
are  six  combinations.  For  example
changes  in  fiscal  decentralization  can  be
either  positively  or  negatively  related  to
changes  in  administrative  or  political
decentralization.  The interaction  could  be
more  complex;  in  which  decentralization
along two dimensions augments or offsets
decentralization  along  the  third.
Alternatively,  decentralization  along  one
dimension might augment decentralization
along  another,  but  this  relation might  not
work  in  reverse.  These  possibilities  are
however, difficult to test statistically. 
Thus it  is  not  surprising  that  attempts  to
find causal relation have produced mixed,
inconclusive or at best conditional results.
Kent Eaton (2003) in his study evaluates a
hypothesis  that,  ‘it  is  the  democratic
election  of  sub-national  officials  in
particular  that  unleashes  powerful  and
ultimately irresistible pressures from below
for  greater  fiscal  decentralization.  In  this
view, fiscal authority follows elections’. The
question  asked  is  whether  political
decentralization  has  caused  fiscal
decentralization?  According  to  the
research  presented  by  the  author,
elections  for  sub-national  offices  in  the
20th century quite consistently led to fiscal
decentralization in Argentina and Brazil, but
not in Chile and Uruguay. Schneider (2003)
speculates,  “Fiscal  decentralization  might
generate  greater  administrative
decentralization.  This  would  occur  if  local
units used increased resources for a power
grab and asserted administrative autonomy
from  the  centre.  Alternatively,  fiscal
decentralization  might  lead  to  less
administrative decentralization.  This would
occur if central governments systematically
tried to counteract any release of resources
with  an  increase  in  bureaucratic  or
regulatory controls”. 
Thus the issue of matching fiscal,  political
and  administrative  arrangements  to
achieve  the  optimal  mix  is  a  difficult  but
important  design  issue.  Such  policy
synchronization  is  difficult  because  each
service  and  even  each  function  within  a
service will differ with regard to appropriate
form  of  decentralization.  Thus  the
challenge of designing decentralization has
been  linked  to  a  soufflé  where  all
ingredients  must  be  present  in  the  right
amounts and prepared in the right  way to
achieve success (Parker, 1995).
Another  related  aspect  of  designing
decentralization  is  that  of  proper
sequencing.  Though  it  is  widely  accepted
that both political and fiscal decentralization
are  complementary  to  each  other  for
overall success of the programme1 but the
question is of sequencing.  The question is
sometimes  posed  as  to  whether  fiscal
decentralization  should  precede  or  follow
political  decentralization?  There  are
scholarly works justifying both sides of the
argument. Jamie Boex (2001) asserts,” An
important  precondition  of  fiscal
decentralization  is  political
decentralization.”  (p,3).  He  argues  that
fiscal decentralization is the “assignment of
fiscal  decision  making  power  and
management responsibilities to lower levels
of the government. This definition implicitly
assumes  that  subnational  governments
have  a certain  degree  of  fiscal  discretion
and  are  accountable  to  their  regional
constituents.  Nothing  but  political
decentralization provide local governments
with  real  decision making power,  which is
neither  provided  by  deconcentration  nor
delegation as subnational governments  in
such  forms  of  decentralization
(predominantly administrative ) continue to
be accountable to the center,  as opposed
to being responsive to the local  populace
that they serve” (p3). Wildasin (1995) also
puts  political  conditions  for  success  of
fiscal  decentralization.  He argues that  the
presumption  that  fiscal  decentralization  is
conducive  to  allocative  efficiency “depend
critically  on  the  decision  making
mechanism of lower level government and
on  the  constraints  on  local  decision
makers,  for  example  the ease  with  which
households and firms can escape or enter
localities  in  response  to  their  fiscal
attractiveness  or  lack  thereof.  If  “exit”  is
constrained  and  there  are  no  effective
channels  for  “voice”,  there  is  no
particular  presumption  in  support  of
the  view  that  fiscal  decentralization
enhances  allocative  efficiency”.  He
argues  that  enhancing  the
responsiveness  of  local  institutions,
either  by  democratizing  them  or  by
making  them  more  competitive  is  a
task  that  warrants  explicit
consideration  in  the  developing
country  context.  But  adds  in  a
footnote (fn2) that the example of the
competitive  firm  shows  that
democratization  (political
decentralization) is not always crucial
for  allocative  efficiency.  Democratic
political reform may be important for
the  success  of  some  types of  fiscal
decentralization  but  not  necessarily
for all.
 
On the other side of the spectrum lies
the sweeping argument that bringing
political decentralization prior to fiscal
decentralization is like putting the cart
before  the  horse.  Bardhan  and
Mookherjee (1998) argue that if local
accountability is limited (which is best
ensured by devolving fiscal  authority
2),  political  decentralization  will  lead
to  local  capture.  Political
decentralization may therefore simply
transfer power from national  to local
elites.  In  this  respect,  it  has  often
been  argued  that  the  institutional
foundations  for  fiscal  federalism,
such  as  revenue-sharing
arrangements and expenditure rules,
should  be  in  place  before  political
decentralization  and  political
liberalization  begins.  As  Burki  and
others  (1999)  have  argued,  “The
political  impetus  behind
decentralization  prompts  central
governments  to  make  political
concessions  hastily.  But  granting
local elections is a step that can be
taken rapidly. What  is difficult  is the
working  through  new  regulatory
relations  between  central  and
subnational  governments  and
working  out  a  system  of  tax
assignment,  intergovernmental
transfers  and  transfer  of  central
government assets” (p33).
In  the  case  of  Russia according  to
Word  Bank  Development  Report
1999-2000, the  fact  that  political
decentralization  preceded  fiscal
decentralization,  may also  have had
an  adverse  effect  on  macro
instability.  The  report  says “…
sometimes  in  the  process  of
decentralization cart is put before the
horse i.e.  political  decentralization is
brought first. It happens also because
political  impetus  behind
decentralization  prompts  central
governments  to  make  concessions
hastily.  Further,  granting  local
elections is a step that can be taken
rapidly. But making decentralization a
success requires taking a number of
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slow  and  difficult  steps  that  create  new
regulatory  relationships  between  central
and  subcentral  governments,  transfers
assets and staff to local levels and replace
annual  budgetary transfers with a system
of  tax  assignment  and  intergovernmental
transfers.  The  recent  history  of
decentralization illustrates the dangers of
not sequencing appropriately”. Thus World
Bank Report offers the policy direction “Put
expenditure  and  revenue  rules  in  place
before political liberalization”. (World Bank
Report 1999-2000). Olivier Blanchard and
Andrei  Shleifer’s  (2000)  analysis  also
suggest  that  federalism  in  Russia  has
failed  precisely  because  of  political
decentralization. “There is no question that
carefully  designed  tax  and  other  fiscal
policies  can  raise the share  of  revenues
from  additional  growth  going  to  local
governments in  Russia.  Nevertheless,
given  the  low  level  of  political
centralization,  such  fiscal  measures  may
not  be  enough  to  induce  local
governments to foster growth”. (p10).
The diversity in above studies is indicative
of  the  imperative  call  for  revisiting  the
propositions regarding mutual interactions
of  political  and  fiscal  decentralization  in
context of globalization. To refer to another
trend  in  the  literature  mention  could  be
made  of  a  recent  paper  by  Geoffrey
Garrett  and  Jonathan  Rodden  (2001).
They  show that  globalization have had a
different  impact  on  political  and  fiscal
decentralization. The authors thus contrast
the  likely  effects  of  globalization  on
political and fiscal authority. Globalization,
they argue, “may strengthen the credibility
of regional autonomy movements and put
pressure on central  governments to cede
policy control  to local  officials.  But it  may
also  encourage  regions  that  choose  to
stay  within  countries  to  push  for  fiscal
arrangements  that  better  mitigate  market
risk for citizens within their borders. It may
be  a  combination  of  political
decentralization  and  fiscal  centralization
that  best  achieves  these  objectives.  It  is
somewhat  surprising  that  these
conjectures  have  not  made  it  into  the
literature until  now”. Thus their  recipe for
sequencing and design is exactly opposite
to that proposed by Olivier Blanchard and
Andrei  Shleifer’s  (2000)  and  the  World
Bank  (1999)  which  combines  fiscal
decentralization  with  political
centralization.
Though  in  light  of  the  above  a  clear-cut
statement  regarding  the  strategy  or
sequencing of decentralization (in terms of
fiscal first or political first) becomes difficult
to highlight yet to touch the bottom line it
can be  said  that  political  decentralization
and  fiscal  decentralization  are  two
separate  dimensions  and  can  exist
independently in absence of the other. As
Scottish  devolution  shows,  for  example,
substantial  political  decentralization  might
take place without fiscal decentralization.”
[Geoffrey  Garrett  and  Jonathan  Rodden
(2001)] and vice versa.
The foregoing discussion implies that there
is  no  “one  size  fits  all”  type  answer  to
decentralization  question.  All  systems  will
have to work out  their  own style  of  going
about decentralization and restructuring of
intergovernmental  relations  depending  on
the context and conditions peculiar to their
own situation. 
C. The Question of Pace: Incremental or
Big Bang
Another aspect related to policy design is
the  concern  regarding  the  pace  of  the
decentralization  process.  There  are
arguments  favoring  “incremental
decentralization”  as  well  as  “big  bang
decentralization”. Those who support slow,
incremental or partial decentralization draw
attention toward probable downside risks of
decentralization. Most significant among all
is  the  concern  with  decline  in  service
delivery  on  account  of  ‘capture  by  local
elites’ and low technical capabilities of local
government.  It  is  feared  that  (a)  the
possibility  is  always  there  that  the  locally
elected  officials  will  spend  the  money  in
their  own  interest  rather  than  interest  of
their constituents and (b) what is gained in
better information (as the argument goes in
favour  of  decentralization)  may be lost  in
lower technical competence/capacity and in
lack of  economies of  scale.  In addition to
this the suggestion to keep the pace slow
also  come  on  the  basis  of  deeply
entrenched  historical  basis  that
centralization  legacy  creates  to  the
disadvantage  of  ongoing  process  of
decentralization.  Thus  Prud’Homme
advices, “A century of centralization cannot
(and should not) be overruled overnight….
(Decentralization) will remain on agenda for
many  years”  (  Prud’Homme,2001)  .
Concerns  with  the  risks  associated  with
decentralization  have  in  fact  prompted
some  Latin  American  and  Caribbean
countries  to  favour  slow,  incremental  and
piecemeal  decentralization.  Programs
geared  to  strengthening  subnational
government  technical  capacity  have  been
implemented in every country in the region.
Incremental  approach  has  also  taken  the
form  of  micro  monitored  earmarking  (for
instance,  in  Mexican  approach  to  sector
decentralization).  Econometric  results
reported  in  a  World  bank  Report  [Shahid
Javed  Burki,  Guillermo  E.  Perry,  and
William R. Dillinger, 1999] suggest that fast
decentralization  normally  leads  to  higher
overall  public  expenditures  and  serious
problems in macroeconomic management. 
On  the  other  hand  arguments  such  as
bureaucratic  resistance  and  interests  and
attitudes  of  powerful  stakeholders  (which
could  be  seen  as  the  outcome  of
centralization  legacy)  have  been  used  to
argue  for  exactly  opposite  approach  to
decentralization i.e. the big bang approach.
The proponents of big bang approach draw
attention  towards  the  constraints  imposed
by  anti  decentralization  coalitions
which,  it  is  expressed,  can  only  be
overcome if  a  political  breakthrough
is  made  by  large  scale
decentralization  rather  than  by
moderate  decentralization.  It  is
feared that policy reform of any sort
will be confronted by vested interests
such as central bureaucrats and local
governments  aiming  to  protect  their
privileges, which could install  such a
reform  or  call  for  a  major  setback
(Rodrik 1996).  Alternatively, different
political  groups  that  are  affected  by
different  policy  reforms  may  form  a
coalition  to  halt  these  reforms
altogether ( Wei, 1997). Taking such
concerns  as  justifications,  Motohiro
Sato  (2002)  suggests,  “In  reality
therefore, economic reform plan must
be accompanied by proper tactics to
overcome  political  oppositions  from
stakeholders  within  and outside of a
central  government”.  The  author
shows  that  how  (against  intuition)
large scale decentralization may turn
out to be more successful in forming
a  political  majority  of  pro
decentralization and thus overcoming
the  political  constraint.  It  is  pointed
out  that  a  small  scale  reform  will
always  remain  constrained  by  a
coalition of rent seeker governments
and  thus  a  theoretical  model  is
provided  to  prove  the  case  for  “big
push”  or  “big  bang”  approach  for
decentralization.  
Keeping in view the above arguments
the  bottom  line  statement  one  can
arrive  at  is  the  assertion  that  pace
(along  with  design,  sequencing  and
proper  mix)  should  be  “optimal”
because each approach has its own
costs  and  benefits.  Optimal  pace  is
more  than  highly  cautious  approach
of  gradualism  which  fails  to  replace
even the most inefficient institutions.
It  is  on  the  other  hand  less
enthusiastic  than  the  shock  therapy
designed  to  replace  the  old
institutions all at once. Thus it aims at
the  best  of  both  worlds.   The
optimality  however,  must  be
ascertained on case by case basis in
accordance with the specificities and
peculiarities  of  the  country  in
question.  Peng  Lian  and  Shang-Jin
Wei (1998) study the economics and
political economy of optimal scale of
reforms.  The  authors  argue  that  if
agents  in  the  economy  are
heterogeneous  in  terms  of  their
subjective  discount  rates,  the
politically-determined  reform  speed
may be lower in a democracy than in
an  economy  with  a  benevolent
dictator.  Prud’Homme(2001)
observes that each country must find
its  own  model  that  best  fits  its
tradition,  geography,  economy,
income  level,  social  structure  and
political  choices.  Lessons  in  theory
and study of international experience
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can be useful for defining such a model for
a particular country. 
(D) The Question of Optimum Degree:
Centralization- Decentralization
Continuum
The impression that one gathers from the
literature survey and analytical observation
of the  various cases in point  is that one
reason  as  to  why  decentralization  in
certain  cases  is  producing  unintended
consequences  is  probably  that  policy
makers,  while  being  driven  by  political
pressures, fail to diagnose as to what ails
their polities and economies and thereby,
ignore  the  prospects  of  grounding  the
program in deeper appreciation of applying
and  adjusting  principles of  federal
organization  to  their  county  specific
context.  
Oates (1972) compares the alternatives of
a  centralized  and  decentralized
government  in  terms  of  their  ability  to
deliver  the  three  tasks  identified  for  the
public  sector  by  Musgrave(  stabilization,
redistribution  and allocation  ).  He argues
that  both  the  options  of  centralized  and
decentralized  government  have  relative
advantages  and  disadvantages,  so  the
optimal  system  would  be  one  that
combines  the  strengths  of  both  while
avoiding  their  weaknesses:  “a  federal
organization of  government  meets  this
need.”(Oates 1972, chapter 1, p14). 
In  fact  the  idea  of  balancing  the
contrasting  forces  of  centralization  and
decentralization is central to the concept of
federalism.  These two movements  are at
work  in  European  Union.  The  notion  of
fiscal  federalism  as  predominantly
centralizing  (unifying)  force  led  to  the
emergence  of  an  integrated  European
Union3 in November 1993. The Maastricht
Treaty  of  Nov.  1993  conferred  important
new powers  on the  European Parliament
including  co-decision  making  on
legislation. This creation and evolution of a
new top level of government in Europe in
context of  European Monetary Integration
has  significant  spatial  consequences  in
which national factors are gradually losing
relevance  with  vanishing  of  old  borders
and  redistribution  of  roles  at  nation  and
regional  levels.  The  biggest  riddle
according to Inman and Rubinfeld  (1992)
is “the future of the national governments
of the member states”.   However,  on the
other hand,  the 'subsidiarity principle’ was
also  formally  adopted  as  a  quasi-
constitutional rule through Article 3b of the
Maastricht-Treaty—which  stipulates  that
the powers of EU institutions be limited to
those functions that cannot be adequately
performed  by  member  states.  More
recently, while on the one hand the notion
that  monetary  policy  be  centralized  has
gained acceptance among the Europeans,
the  idea  to  centralize  fiscal  policy  in  the
European Union (EU) has generally been
rejected. Thus there are contrasting forces
of  centralization  and  decentralization  at
work. 
All this has generated a lot of rethinking on
implications of economic integration within
European Union for  the fiscal  structure of
EU specifically and on the concept of fiscal
federalism  more  generally.  The
contradictions  emerging  from  the  working
of contrasting forces, some leading toward
greater  centralization  and  others  toward
greater  decentralization  which  are  at  the
heart  of  fiscal  federalism  have  become
more pronounced than ever in the context
of  new  global  economic  order.   This
phenomenon is not restricted to EU but is
also  to  be  seen in  those  countries  which
are  moving  toward  market  economy after
failure of centralized planning, in context of
‘globalization’.
The dilemma of balancing  the contrasting
forces of centralization and decentralization
that  is  inherent  to  the  very  dynamics  of
federalism,  is  more  pronounced  in  the
developing  and  transition  countries,  the
nations  that  are  on  one  hand  trying  to
stabilize their economies while on the other
“… trying  to  invest  more  decision  making
power in populations that have  long been
disenfranchised” ( Bahl, 1995) thus ideally
trying  to  “combine  the  advantages  of
magnitude  and  littleness  of  nations”
(Tocqueville,1945)  and  in  consequence
getting confronted with the predicament of
resolving the trade off  between autonomy
and  efficiency  signifying  a  movement
toward  decentralization  and  centralization
respectively.
Most  of  the  studies  on  the  ‘centralization
versus decentralization issue’ tilt heavily in
favour  of  decentralization.  The arguments
to support this stand are quite familiar. It is
acknowledged  that  decentralization,
besides giving many other advantages may
also  avoid  noted  inefficiencies  of
centralized decision-making such as:
(a) Central officials may often lack detailed
information  about  local  tastes  (Hayek
1948).
(b)  Decision-making  by  a  centralized
legislature may permit a narrow majority of
regions  to  expropriate  the  others,  or
generate norms of reciprocity that result in
overspending  (Besley  and  Coate  2000;
Weingast 1979). 
(c)  Central  government’s  ability  to  insure
regions  against  exogenous  shocks,
increasing welfare, will create moral hazard
for  the  regions  (Persson  and  Tabellini
1996).
More  recent  literature  however,  suggests
that  decentralization,  unless  carried  out
under  the  aegis  of  a  reasonably  strong
centre, is doomed to fail. A weak center is
prone  to  get  manipulated  by  the  strong
coalitions  and  interest  groups.  There  is
overwhelming consensus that  most  of the
problems  associated  with  decentralization
can  be  solved  by  central  government
intervention  and  regulatory  powers
entrusted  in  it  (Cumberland  1981,
Gordon1983,  Rivlin  1992,  Wildasin
1989).  While  comparing  a  case  of
strong  centre  with  weak,  Blanchard
and  Anderei  Shleifer  (2000),  argue
that  fiscal  decentralization has been
successful  in  China  because  centre
in China is strong enough to restrain
destructive behavior of local interests
and  withstand  unhealthy  local
demands.  On  the  other  hand  the
process  in  Russia  is,  at  best,  just
wavering, all because of weak centre.
They  show  in  their  study  that
decentralization  in  developing  and
transitional  countries  can  lead  to
capture of local governments. In such
cases  the  authors  argue,  strong
administrative  control  of  local  by
central  authorities  is  important  for
efficient  economic  decentralization.
Thus  for  decentralization  to  be
successful  one  of  the  conditions
(among  others)  is  that  it  must  be
balanced  with  provision  of  a  strong
central  government  with  ability  and
willingness  to  resist  unhealthy
demands  from  lower  levels  of  the
government.  This  argument  endorse
Riker’s  (1964)  suggestion  that
centralization  does  matter  for
federalism  to  be  effective.  To move
even earlier one can quote none else
than de Tocqueville, he writes, “From
my perspective,  I  cannot  imagine  a
nation  that  could  survive  and
especially  prosper  without  strong
government centralization.”  (Oeuvres
Completes,  Vol  I,  1,  p. 87). In 1836
after  living  for  several  months  in
Switzerland  he  wrote  “I  have
developed  such  an  utter  disdain  for
the  federal  constitution  of
Switzerland,  that  I  would
unequivocally  term  it  a  league  and
not  a  federation.  A  government  of
that  nature  is  certainly  the  weakest,
the most impotent, the clumsiest and
the  least  capable  of  leading  its
people  anywhere  except  to  anarchy
that  one  could  imagine.  I  am  also
struck by the lack of any vie politique
in  its  population.  The  Kingdom  of
England  is  a  hundred  times  more
republican  than  this  republic.”
(Oeuvres  Completes,  Vol.  XV,  1,  p.
70-71).
Various  studies  show  that  fiscal
decentralization  may  lead  to
allocative  inefficiencies,  as  well  as
poor  accountability  and  governance,
if  expenditures  and  revenue
mobilization  functions  are  not
properly assigned across the different
levels  of  the  government  (Hommes,
1995;   World  Bank,  1999  and
Fukasaku  and  demello,  1999).
Hommes  (1995)  sees
decentralization  as  “essentially  a
political  problem”  representing,  in
Latin  America  for  example,  a  stark
departure  from  centuries  of
centralism.  The  success  of
decentralization  may  depend  upon
S A J O S P S  July-Dec 2005. 42
the existence at  the local  level  of  a civic
cultural  tradition—informal  civic
institutions,  such  as  solidarity,
cooperatives,  etc.  With  a  lack  of  local
governmental experience and riddled with
patronage,  local  governments  in  Latin
America  tend  to  be  captive  of  the  elites
and  political  barons.  Thus,  for  Hommes,
an irony of fiscal decentralization may be
the  need  for  more  central  government
controls  to  protect  against  this  danger.
Hommes notes that the seeming paradox
of decentralization is that it demands of the
central  government  more  ‘sophisticated
political  control’. Ultimately,  however,
effective  decentralization  requires  the
relinquishing  of  some  central  control.  In
fact  the governance literature can help in
exploring the kind of ‘sophisticated control’
that  is  being  considered  more  relevant
than ever in the current scenario. 
This  new  role of  the Center will  not  be
identical  to  the  older  one  where  central
government  played  strong-control  and
commanding  role.  As  governments
restructure, role of centre should be that of
“stewardship”.  Peter  Block  argues  that
principles  of  stewardship  bring  a  new
understanding of accountability to each act
of governance. (Peter Block 1993, p. 27).
In this  concept,  which is quite  popular in
literature of management and organization
in  United  States,  trust  and  service  and
accountability  are  emphasized.  Central
level  of  government  will  perform  tasks
such  as  “  oversight  and  technical
assistance  to  subnational  governments,
macroeconomic coordination, social safety
nets,  skill  enhancement  for  international
competitiveness, social and environmental
policy  through  international  agreements”
(Shah,  2004).  The task  ahead  to  ensure
this  is  to  strengthen  national  level
institutions.  A real  test  of  the strength of
the institution is the ability to  successfully
meld  two  goals:  central  authority  and
subcentral  or  decentralized  engagement
and  empowerment  to  ensure  good
democratic governance.
The  foregoing  discussion  demonstrates
that  decentralization  shall  not  be
considered  as  an  alternative  to
centralization.  Both  are  needed.  “The
complementary  roles  of  national  and
subnational  actors  should  be  determined
by analyzing the most effective ways and
means  of  achieving  a  desired  objective.
For  example,  a  national  road  system
should  be designed with  both  local  input
and  national  coordination.  Foreign  policy
should be a national function based on the
views  of  the  citizenry.  Solid  waste
management should primarily be dealt with
through local mechanisms. And so forth. In
designing  a decentralization  strategy it  is
imperative that such an analysis be done.”
(UNDP,  1998).  The  new  literature  on
political economy of fiscal federalism, goes
far  beyond  the  earlier  issues  of
centralization  and  decentralization.  Now
the  case  is  for  the  center  to  assume
sophisticated  styles  of  remaining  ‘in
charge’  (stewardship/  leadership)  and
constructing  such  support  structures,
processes  and  national  institutions  which
create  enabling  environment4 (in  which
subnational  autonomy  is  tolerated  and
treasured), build local capacity and provide
appropriate incentives for the  subantional
governments  to  behave  responsibly  while
allowing  center  to perform its  new role in
changed political and economic conditions.
The best design for decentralization, in the
last analysis however, will vary according to
circumstances and situations.
Conclusion: 
The  paper  has  argued  that  ‘designing
decentralization’  is  a  very  specific  issue
and  is  to  be  worked  out  differently  in
different  contexts.  In  addition  there  are
certain dimensions of the political economy
of fiscal  federalism5 “in  particular  country-
specific context” that   must not be ignored.
It is also clear that an improper attempt at
fiscal  decentralization  in  fact,  could  be  a
disaster-prone  strategy  while  the  “proper”
distribution of tax authority and expenditure
responsibility  is  an  extremely  complex
issue.  The  problem  in  many  cases
according  to  Prud’homme  is  not  what  to
decentralize  (or  whether  a  service  should
be provided by a central,  regional or local
government  )  but,  rather  how  to  organize
the  joint  production  (shared  rule)  of  the
service  by  various  levels  (Prud’homme,
1995)  The riddle  can  be  solved  only  if  a
comprehensive  view  of  the  political
economy of fiscal federalism is considered
instead  of  a  narrow  approach  to  fiscal
decentralization.
Since success of decentralization depends
on its design, an overall improvement in the
political,  fiscal  and  administrative
institutions  of  decentralization  is  a
precondition before embarking on the path
of decentralization. “But decentralization is
often  implemented  haphazardly.  Decision
makers do not always fully control the pace
and  genesis  of  the  decentralization
process.” (WB1999). Thus what is required
is that decentralization as it is understood
and pursued in  recent  times must  not  be
detached  from  broader  and  constantly
expanding perspective on fiscal federalism,
the  intellectual  lineage  of  which  can  only
offer  a  framework  for  successful
decentralization. 
The  conceptual  framework  of  fiscal
decentralization is well established in fiscal
federalism literature, drawing largely on the
contributions  by  Stigler,  Samuelson,
Musgrave,  Oates,  and  Brennan  and
Buchanan  the  understanding  of  which  is
further  expanding  with  the  emerging
second  generation  theory  of  fiscal
federalism  with  important  contributions
from Inman and Rubinfields , Weingast and
others..  The central  logic  is  that  the  core
issues  of  growth  and  poverty  (the
justification  offered  for  economic  reforms
across the globe after failure of the earlier
paradigms)  cannot  be  addressed  without
addressing  efficiency—‘supplying
services up to the point at which, at
the  margin,  the  welfare  benefit  to
society matches its cost’.
Though the conceptual framework of
fiscal  decentralization  is  well
established  in  fiscal  federalism
literature  yet  there  is  no  set  of
prescribed  rules  for  fiscal
decentralization.  Roy  Bhal,  however
on the basis of best practices in fiscal
federalism delineates twelve rules for
fiscal decentralization which are well
grounded  in  the  theory  of  fiscal
federalism. These are: Roy Bahl’s XII
Rules  for  Fiscal  Decentralization:  1.
Fiscal  decentralization  should  be
viewed as a comprehensive system.
2. Finance follows function. 3. There
must  be  a  strong  central  ability  to
monitor and evaluate decentralization
4.  One  intergovernmental  system
does  not  fit  the  urban  and  rural
sector.  5.  Fiscal  decentralization
requires significant local  government
taxing power.  6. Central  government
must keep the fiscal decentralization
rules that it  makes. 7.Keep it  simple
8.  The  design  of  intergovernmental
transfer  system  must  match  the
objectives of decentralization reform.
9.  Fiscal  decentralization  should
consider  all  the  three  levels  of
government.  10.  Impose  a  hard
budget constraint.  11.Recognize that
Intergovernmental  systems  are
always in transition, plan for this. 12.
There must be a champion for fiscal
decentralization.  (Meaning  that  one
must defeat very strong centralization
arguments.
Thus,  to  proceed  with  fiscal
decentralization  while  detaching  it
from federal dimensions and political
economy  considerations  inherent  in
fiscal  federalism  is  no  doubt
dangerous.  At  this  point  it  needs  to
be asserted that while bringing about
fiscal  decentralization in any country
(whether  unitary  or  federal,
developing,  transitional  or
industrialized);  the  principles  of
political economy of fiscal federalism
should not be lost sight of.  The term
fiscal  federalism  according  to  Nieo
Grornrndijk  (2002  p1)  “is  often
wrongfully associated with the theory
of  fiscal  decentralization  within
federal  states  only”.  It  is  applicable
even to non federal states (having no
formal  federal
constitutional/institutional
arrangement)  also  in  the sense that
they  encompass  different  levels  of
government  which  have  de  facto
decision making authority. David King
(1984) thus highlights that the  ideas
of fiscal federalism are applicable to
a range of structures of government,
including  unitary  states.  While
drawing  attention  to  this  aspect
Jamie  Boex  (2001)  stresses  that
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“fiscal  decentralization  is  relevant  to  all
countries,  regardless  whether  they  are
unitary  countries,  federal  countries  or
confederations”.  Though  the  manner  in
which the principle will be applied will differ
in  each  case  as  the  unitary  and  federal
governments  provide  different
opportunities for fiscal decentralization due
to  divergence  in  their  respective  political
and  legislative  context.  However,  it  must
be reasserted that  to  regain the dynamic
stability inherent in fiscal federalism, there
is a  need to  “put  federal  back into  fiscal
federalism” (Michael Keen, 1998) which is
notable  in  decentralization  literature  only
by  its  absence  and  which  has  been
identified  as  one  cause  behind
‘decentralization failure’. It must be added
here  that  “adherence  to  the  principles  of
federalism or getting the rules of the game
right  is  a  necessary  but  not  a  sufficient
condition  for  success  of  decentralized
decision  making.  Complementary  formal
and  informal  institutions  are  needed  to
ensure that all players in the game adhere
to  agreed  upon  set  of  ground  rules  and
deviant  behavior  is  properly  dealt  with.
This will need:
•  Institutions  and  Processes  of
Intergovernmental Coordination.
•  Institutional  Arrangements  for  Fiscal
Relations
•  Institutions  of  Accountability.”
(Shah,2004 p 31-34)
End Notes: 
1.  As  William  Dillinger  and  Stewen
B.Webb  (1999)  put  it,  “it is  difficult  to
imagine what the restoration of democracy
would  have  been  like  without  substantial
political  decentralization—federalism—and
some  concomitant  form  of  fiscal
decentralization”.  Dillinger,  William  and
Stewen  B.Webb  (1999)  Fiscal
Management  in  Federal  democracies:
Argentina and Brazil, World Bank Working
paper No : 2121 (Washington May 1999).
2. Importance of accountability lies in the
fact  that  it  clearly  demarcates  who  is
responsible for what. But accountability is
not  enough.  Those  who  are  accountable
must  also  have  the  authority  to  deliver
results.  This  means  not  merely  the  legal
authority to make decisions,  but  also the
financial  (and  human)  resources  to  carry
them  out.  This  in  fact  is  the  common
theme that runs through the six chapters of
the World Bank study entitled  Beyond the
Center:  Decentralizing  the State  by Burki
Shahid  Javed,Guillermo  E.  Perry,  and
William R. Dillinger. (1999). 
3.  The  European  Economic  Community
came into existence in 1957 and was the
result  of  a  sustained  effort  to  create  a
sense of common European purpose. The
first  six  Member  States  were  Belgium,
France,  Germany,  Italy,  Luxembourg  and
the  Netherlands.  Other  Member  States
subsequently.The  European  Union  was
established  in  November,  1993  on  the
entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty  on  the
European  Union  (The Maastricht  Treaty).
This  Treaty  conferred  important  new
powers  on  the  European  Parliament
including co-decision making on legislation.
4.  ‘Enabling  environment’  means-
institutions  of  citizen  participation  and
accountability. Anwar Shah adds the notion
of – “authorizing environment” which in his
words,  “represents  the  institutional
mechanisms  to  translate  constitutional
mission to concrete objectives and actions.
These include  societal  norms,  formal  and
informal  rules,  procedures  and
organizations  dealing  with  participation,
consultation,  policy  making  and
accountability. Legislative coordination and
oversight bodies are important elements of
authorizing environment. These institutions
ensure that public sector is solely focused
on citizen aspirations.” (Shah, 2004, p6).
5.  The  political  economy  of  a  fiscal
federation  in  which  spending  is
decentralized and taxation is not (as in the
Scottish case) is very different from one in
which taxation is decentralized as well (as
in  the  US).  Further  political  economy  of
fiscal  federalism  in  a  developing  country
attempting to decentralize is different from
a  developed  country  on  account  of   the
unintended  consequences  that  relatively
less  developed  institutions  of
accountability, governance and capacity in
developing  countries  might  have  on
decentralization policies
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